The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640-1945 (Galaxy Books)

Craig's conclusions on the Prussian officer corps, their reforms and their performance are rather "standard" as far as historical interpretations go - but that is due in no small part to the fact that the author in many ways set the standard. The most salient theme of the book is that for all the German military got right in planning, strategy and innovation, it was never able to effectively solve the civil-military relationship issue, and it was that failure that led to the disasters of the First and Second World Wars.

In Craig's opinion, the opportunity for success was formulated but squandered early in 19th century. After the devastating defeat at Jena in 1807 at the hands of Napoleon, the once vaunted Prussian military had to assess how and why the disaster had occurred. The solution presented by the great military reformer Scharnhorst was the institutionalization of military genius in a centralized, elite general staff and the accountability of the armed services to the German people through an oath of allegiance to a republican constitution, rather than personal fealty to the monarch. The former was adopted and proved a stunning success, especially in the wars against the Danes, Austrians and French in 1866-1872. However, the conservative officer corps' unwillingness to embrace the more liberal reform set forth by Scharnhorst kept the military at odds with the nation it served and ultimately led to the military's political dominance in World War I and political subjugation in World War II.

If you have a keen interest in civil-military relations, German history, or the development of the General Staff system this book is simply indispensable.

The author uses myriad German source material for his references, and the story he tells is accurate, lively, and riveting. He knows his material, and his subject, and is unflinching in calling a spade a spade when necessary. While I am only interested in those portions relating to the Napoleonic period and its immediate aftermath, students of the Prussian/German Army will find this book invaluable.

Craig's bona fides are impeccable and he writes with authority, verve, and accuracy. His analysis of the Prussian Army's beginnings in the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War set the definition and trends for what the Prussian Army would become, something apart from the people of Prussia and an army supported by a dynastic state. His demonstration of the effectiveness of the instrument under the Great Frederick, and of his policies, and those of his successors after the Seven Years' War, tell the tale of why is became nothing more than a 'parade ground facade', made up of half-foreign mercenary strength, which were two of the many reasons for its defeat and destruction by Napoleon and the Grande Armee in 1806.

The coverage of the Prussian reformers is also excellent, and dispels many myths, some of which unforunately are resurfacing under the guise of 'recent scholarship.' The War of Liberation from Napoleon was in actuality a war of liberating whatever German territory Prussia could grab in the chaos of the aftermath of French hegemony in western Germany (they took the Rhineland, most of Westphalia, and about half of Saxony, keeping the Saxon king, Napoleon's ally, as a prisoner of war). Additionally, force had to be used in Prussia to get the manpower required to fight the Grande Armee. The end of the tale is also excellently told-that of how the reformers, so necessary to Prussian resurgence, were treated and eventually disposed of politically, the Prussian monarchy almost completely retrenching to pre-1806 'values.'

All in all this is an excellent volume for students and historians of the period or of the Prussian/German army in particular. It is highly recommended.